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INTRODUCTION 
It was quite predictable that Justice Anthony Kennedy would write the 
Court’s opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges finding that the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires States to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
on the same terms as different-sexed couples.1  After all, Justice Kennedy 
authored not only the Court’s most recent and closely divided same-sex 
marriage case of United States v. Windsor finding the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) unconstitutional,2 but also the less closely divided 
previous “gay rights” cases, Lawrence v. Texas3 and Romer v. Evans.4  He 
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1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2 United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
3 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
4 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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was being touted as the “first gay justice,”5 a “gay icon,”6 gay-rights 
“hero,”7 and “the towering giant” in the struggle for LGBT equality,8 even 
before Obergefell. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Obergefell 
seemingly cements his reputation as a champion of LGBTQ rights.  
 
Justice Kennedy’s opinions for the Court in the quartet of LGBTQ cases - - 
- Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell - - - have provoked only one 
concurrence (Justice O’Connor in Lawrence),9 even as the dissenting 
opinions have become increasingly numerous and fractured.10  The unity of 
 
5 Bill Mears, Is Anthony Kennedy 'the first gay justice'?, CNN POLITICS (June 28, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/27/politics/scotus-kennedy/ (“"If Bill Clinton 
was 'the first black president,' Anthony Kennedy has now firmly secured his place 
in history as 'the first gay justice,'" said Michael Dorf, a law professor at Cornell 
University and a former Kennedy law clerk." Justice Kennedy makes clear that he 
not only accepts, but welcomes the task of writing majestic opinions affirming the 
dignity of gay persons and couples.”).  
6 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Tolerance Is Seen in His 
Sacramento Roots, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/22/us/kennedys-gay-rights-rulings-seen-in-his-
sacramento-roots html (“Justice Kennedy, a onetime altar boy, has emerged as an 
unlikely gay rights icon. At 78, he has advanced legal equality for gays more than 
any other American jurist.”).  
7 Richard Socarides, The Top Ten Gay-Rights Heroes of 2013, THE NEW YORKER 
(December 16, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-top-ten-
gay-rights-heroes-of-2013 (listing Justice Kennedy third after Edie Windsor, 
plaintiff in United States v. Windor, and Pope Francis).  
8 Adam Liptak, Surprising Friend of Gay Rights in a High Place, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/surprising-friend-of-gay-
rights-in-a-high-place.html (“"He is the towering giant in the jurisprudence of 
freedom and equality for gay people," said Evan Wolfson, the president of 
Freedom to Marry and one of the architects of the political and legal push for 
same-sex marriage.”).  
9 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
O’Connor wrote that she disagreed that the Court should overrule Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in which she had joined the majority in upholding 
the constitutionality of Georgia’s criminalization of sodomy. Id. However, she 
agreed with the Court in Lawrence that Texas’ statute banning same-sex sodomy is 
unconstitutional, but under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause 
rather than the Due Process Clause. Id. 
10 In Romer v. Evans, Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined. See 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the so-called liberal Justices may seem remarkable. But it is also strategic.  
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, speaking about Obergefell in a public 
conversation, noted that it was “more powerful” to have a single opinion 
from the Court.11 She “said she keeps a volume of the unpublished opinions 
of Justice Louis Brandeis in her office as a reminder that is it not always 
prudent for justices to publicly explain every detail of their diverging 
opinions.”12 
 
Yet what if Justice Ginsburg had written an opinion?  And what if that 
opinion were not a concurring opinion, but the Court’s opinion in 
Obergefell v. Hodges? As Justice Ginsburg has intimated, her opinion 
would be more focused on the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13  But it is not only the 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that would be distinct. This Essay 
suggests that Justice Ginsburg’s opinion would have been different in three 
essential ways from the one by Justice Kennedy for the Court: it would 
have been more doctrinally rigorous; it would have been less sentimental; 
 
 In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, joined, see 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Justice Thomas also filed a separate dissenting opinion. See 
id. at 605 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 In United States v. Windsor, Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion. 
See 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (Roberts, C.J, dissenting). Justice Scalia filed a 
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined, and in which Chief Justice 
Roberts, joined as to Part I. See id. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Alito 
also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts II and 
III. See id. at 2711 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 And in Obergefell v. Hodges, Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Justice Thomas joined. See id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice 
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Scalia joined. See id. at 2631 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined. See id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
11 Justice Ginsburg addresses alumni and Summer Institute in wide-ranging 
conversation with Siegel, DUKE LAW NEWS (Aug. 7, 2015), 
https://law.duke.edu/news/justice-ginsburg-addresses-alumni-and-summer-
institute-wide-ranging-conversation-siegel/. 
12 Id.  
13 Id. (quoting Justice Ginsburg as stating that Kennedy’s opinion contained “a 
nice page on equal protection, and the rest is about due process”). 
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and it would have jurisprudential integrity.  This Essay considers each of 
these characteristics in turn. 
 
I. 
DOCTRINAL RIGOR 
 
It would be difficult to argue that Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court 
in Obergefell v. Hodges is doctrinally rigorous.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy 
has rightly been criticized for the lack of doctrinal rigor in his “gay rights” 
cases, most especially the same-sex marriage cases of Obergefell and 
Windsor. For example, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Obergefell, contended 
that the while the “world does not expect logic and precision in poetry or 
inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law.”14 He continued 
that the “stuff contained in today’s opinion has to diminish this Court’s 
reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.”15   Likewise, Justice 
Scalia dissenting in Windsor, argued that it is “remarkable” how “rootless 
and shifting” the Court’s reasoning is, noting that “if this is meant to be an 
equal-protection opinion, it is a confusing one” that does not resolve the 
central debate regarding how closely the courts should scrutinize the 
federal law banning recognition of same-sex marriages.16  Dissenting in 
 
14 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
15 Id. 
16 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706-07 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
Scalia wrote: 
The majority opinion need not get into the strict-vs.-rational-basis 
scrutiny question, and need not justify its holding under either, because it 
says that DOMA is unconstitutional as “a deprivation of the liberty of the 
person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution;” that it 
violates “basic due process” principles; and that it inflicts an “injury and 
indignity” of a kind that denies “an essential part of the liberty protected 
by the Fifth Amendment.” The majority never utters the dread words 
“substantive due process,” perhaps sensing the disrepute into which that 
doctrine has fallen, but that is what those statements mean. . . . . Some 
might conclude that this loaf could have used a while longer in the oven. 
But that would be wrong; it is already overcooked. The most expert care 
in preparation cannot redeem a bad recipe. The sum of all the Court's 
nonspecific hand-waving is that this law is invalid (maybe on equal-
protection grounds, maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and 
perhaps with some amorphous federalism component playing a role) 
SUBMISSION COPY 
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Lawrence, Scalia’s major point was less that Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court lacked a standard rather than it incorrectly applied a standard,17 
although Scalia also seemed to argue that the standard in Lawrence is not 
clear.18  And earlier in Romer, Scalia was again closer to contending that 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court lacked doctrinal support, noting that “the 
Court's failure to cite any case remotely in point would lead one to suspect: 
No principle set forth in the Constitution, nor even any imagined by this 
Court in the past 200 years, prohibits” the Colorado state constitutional 
amendment that prohibited sexual orientation anti-discrimination 
enactments. 19   
 
This is not to suggest that Justice Scalia would have been persuaded by a 
more rigorous legal analysis in any of the cases in the LGBTQ quartet.  
 
because it is motivated by a “ ‘bare ... desire to harm’ ” couples in same-
sex marriages.  
Id. (citations omitted).  
Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Windsor provided some doctrinal clarity; 
before the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell, lower court judges relied on his 
dissent to support their opinions that all same-sex marriage bans were 
unconstitutional. See Ruthann Robson, Justice Scalia’s Petard and Same-Sex 
Marriage, CUNY LAW REVIEW FOOTNOTE FORUM (Mar. 3, 2014), 
http://www.cunylawreview.org/prof-robson-on-justice-scalias-petard. 
17 In Lawrence, Scalia argued that the Court’s opinion never describes the right to 
same-sex sexual relations “as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental liberty 
interest,’ nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny,” but instead 
incorrectly finds the Texas anti-sodomy statute fails the “rational-basis test.” 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He then 
argued that such a “proposition is so out of accord with our jurisprudence—indeed, 
with the jurisprudence of any society we know—that it requires little discussion,” 
and “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation.” Id. at 599. 
18 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That 
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916 (2004) (arguing that 
“One aspect of Lawrence that was bound to draw criticism and is likely to generate 
confusion unless promptly put in proper perspective is the absence of any explicit 
statement in the majority opinion about the standard of review the Court employed 
to assess the constitutionality of the law at issue,” and citing Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion).  
19 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia later 
stated that the Court only reached its conclusion “by inventing a novel and 
extravagant constitutional doctrine to take the victory away from traditional forces, 
but even by verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to traditional attitudes.” Id. 
at 652.  
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Nevertheless, it is worth comparing Scalia’s complaints regarding 
Obergefell, Windsor, and Lawrence, and to a lesser extent Romer, with 
Scalia’s equally heated criticism of Justice Ginsberg’s opinion for the 
Court in United States v. Virginia concluding that the all-male Virginia 
Military Institute (VMI) was unconstitutional.20 In his dissent Scalia 
lamented that the Court “drastically revises our established standards for 
reviewing sex-based classifications,”21 in large part by not hewing 
exclusively to the words of intermediate scrutiny in equal protection sex-
classification cases as articulated in Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan,22  but by including other words from Hogan.23 To be sure, Scalia 
also castigated Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion for rejecting certain 
factual findings regarding the value of same-sex education and for 
disregarding “the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of men's 
military colleges.”24  But Justice Scalia’s main complaint about the Court’s 
VMI opinion was not a lack of doctrinal rigor. 
 
 
20 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  
21 Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
22 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
23 Scalia explained: 
Although the Court in two places recites the test as stated in Hogan, 
which asks whether the State has demonstrated “that the classification 
serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory 
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives,” the Court never answers the question presented in anything 
resembling that form. When it engages in analysis, the Court instead 
prefers the phrase “exceedingly persuasive justification” from Hogan. The 
Court's nine invocations of that phrase, and even its fanciful description of 
that imponderable as “the core instruction” of the Court's decisions in 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. and Hogan, would be unobjectionable if 
the Court acknowledged that whether a “justification” is “exceedingly 
persuasive” must be assessed by asking “[whether] the classification 
serves important governmental objectives and [whether] the 
discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.” Instead, however, the Court proceeds to 
interpret “exceedingly persuasive justification” in a fashion that 
contradicts the reasoning of Hogan and our other precedents. 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
24 Id. at 566.  
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Again, this is not to suggest that Justice Scalia should be the lodestar on the 
degree of analytic rigor in opinions from which he is dissenting.  But to 
agree with the ultimate conclusions of the cases in the LGBTQ quartet is 
not sufficient to rebut the analytic deficiencies of the cases. One obvious 
comparison is to Brown v. Board of Education, famous not only for its 
importance in holding the racial segregation of “separate but equal” 
unconstitutional,25 but also for its perceived lack of what Professor Herbert 
Wechsler deemed “neutral principles.”26 The influential academic defense 
of Brown by Professor Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation 
Decisions, argued that the persuasiveness of Brown was inherent in its 
simplicity, practicality, reason, and claim to equality.27  Professor Toni 
Massaro has taken Black’s celebrated essay and “edited” it to replace the 
references to Brown and racial segregation with references to Obergefell 
and marriage exclusion.28  The result stunningly reveals the parallels.   
 
Professor Massaro wisely argues that scholars should “avoid past errors” in 
the reaction to Brown and appreciate the Court for its “right answer” in 
Obergefell, “however imperfectly defended or expressed,” rather than 
 
25 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
26 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1959). For example, Professor Laurence Tribe likened Lawrence to 
Brown. Tribe, supra note 18, at 1895 (“For when the history of our times is 
written, Lawrence may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of gay and 
lesbian America. But one of the lessons of Brown is that we cannot assume that 
society's acceptance of such watershed decisions--decisions that mediate 
revolutions in the entrenched social order--will be a straightforward and 
predictable process.”). 
27 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE 
L.J. 421 (1960). As Black wrote: 
My liminal difficulty is rhetorical—or, perhaps more accurately, one of 
fashion. Simplicity is out of fashion, and the basic scheme of reasoning on 
which these cases can be justified is awkwardly simple. First, the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment should be read as saying 
that the Negro race, as such, is not to be significantly disadvantaged by 
the laws of the states. Secondly, segregation is a massive intentional 
disadvantaging of the Negro race, as such, by state law. No subtlety at all.  
Id. at 421. 
28 See Toni M. Massaro, The Lawfulness of the Same-Sex Marriage Decisions: 
Charles Black on Obergefell (Aug. 27, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2638552. 
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indulge in critique.29  But perhaps we should take more seriously the 
precedential value of opinions.  Clearly articulated standards and rigorous 
analysis are not simply law professor fantasies.30  While Supreme Court 
opinions need not be constitutional law examination answers, neither 
should they leave their readers - - - including law students - - - longing for 
an articulated  “rule” and applied “reasoning.”31 Additionally, clearly 
articulated standards guide lower federal courts and state courts considering 
similar constitutional challenges.32 It would be a grave mistake to equate 
“marriage equality” with LGBTQ equality, let alone sexual liberation; there 
are many remaining important constitutional issues regarding sexuality.33 
 
29 Id. at 6. 
30 I made similar observations before the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Windsor. See Ruthann Robson, Online same-sex marriage symposium: Toward a 
more perfect analysis, SCOTUSBLOG, (Sept. 19, 2012), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-same-sex-marriage-symposium-
toward-a-more-perfect-analysis/.   
31 Id.  
32 Clarity may be useful even when the constitutional challenges are not obviously 
“similar.” For example, in Hassan v. City of New York, __ F.3d ___, No. 14-1688, 
2015 WL 5933354, at *24 (3d Cir. Oct. 13, 2015), involving an equal protection 
challenge to New York City’s surveillance of Muslims in New Jersey, the Third 
Circuit opinion noted that generally after a court determines that there is 
intentional unequal treatment,  
the adequacy of the reasons for that discrimination are ... separately 
assessed at equal protection's second step” under the appropriate standard 
of review. To apply this traditional legal framework to the facts of this 
case, we must determine the appropriate standard of review (i.e., rational 
basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny) and then ask whether it is 
met. 
Id. at *14 (citation omitted). The Third Circuit opinion then added a footnote to 
this seemingly uncontroversial principle, explaining:  
Although other modes of analysis have also been employed, see, e.g., 
Obergefell v. Hodges, ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2596, 192 
L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), we find it appropriate to apply the conventional two-
part framework in the context of this case. 
Id. at *14 n.8.  
33 For example, I previously argued that 
the Supreme Court’s clear conclusion that sexuality merits intermediate 
scrutiny review, like gender, would disentangle the equal protection 
doctrine from the animus inquiry. While certainly animus can be 
operative, the inquisition into intent invites protestations of moral belief 
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Furthermore, the lack of an explicit and rigorous analysis in Kennedy’s 
opinion for the Court in Obergefell could have easily been avoided.  The 
Court’s opinion lists as an appendix the federal and state decisions that 
have considered the constitutional issue of same-sex marriage.34  As 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court observed,  
Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United 
States Courts of Appeals in recent years. In accordance with the 
judicial duty to base their decisions on principled reasons and 
neutral discussions, without scornful or disparaging commentary, 
courts have written a substantial body of law considering all sides 
of these issues. That case law helps to explain and formulate the 
underlying principles this Court now must consider.35 
But Kennedy’s opinion for the Court does not adopt the rigorous analysis 
 
or religious conviction. The false opposition between equality and morals 
needs to be abandoned. Additionally, the linking of sexual orientation and 
gender as quasi-suspect should lead courts to find classifications based 
upon gender identity, transgender identity, or gender nonconformity as 
similarly subject to intermediate scrutiny review. 
  Additionally, the Supreme Court’s definitive holding that marriage is a 
fundamental right meriting strict scrutiny review would extricate the 
issues from the federalism quagmire. …. Indeed, an explicit declaration of 
marriage as a fundamental right might call into question the plethora of 
federal and state statutes that provide benefits and burdens on the basis of 
marital status. 
For if the Court deemed the right to marry fundamental, then the 
concomitant right – the right not to marry – should likewise be 
fundamental. Revived proposals to condition poverty assistance on 
marital status, as well as tax benefits and burdens based on marital status, 
would require strict judicial scrutiny. While “marriage equality” 
advocates have often quelled the objections of more nonconformist LGBT 
activists with assurances that same-sex marriage will not mandate 
marriage, a judicial commitment to strictly scrutinize government laws 
channeling people into marriage might make the choice whether or not to 
marry less legally over-determined. Although conservative advocates 
have been fretting over the next rung on the slippery ladder – such as 
plural marriage or man-goat marriage – the next marriage equality issue 
might well involve the rights of the unmarried. Rigorous Court decisions . 
. . . might not make such litigation less contentious, only less convoluted. 
See Robson, supra note 30.  
34 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608-2611 (2015) (Appendix A). 
35 Id. at 2597. 
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apparent in so many of these cases.36  One notable exception to this rigor is 
the Sixth Circuit’s opinion to which the Court granted certiorari and that 
had  upheld the same-sex marriage bans in several states as constitutional.37 
Dissenting Sixth Circuit Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey maligned the 
majority’s opinion as more suitable for a “TED Talk or, possibly, an 
introductory lecture in Political Philosophy,”than an appellate court 
decision grappling with the relevant constitutional question.38 But one 
could argue that Justice Kennedy’s opinion is uncomfortably close to such 
an unflattering characterization. 
An opinion by Justice Ginsburg for the Court in Obergefell would have 
been more likely to clearly articulate a standard and engage in rigorous 
analysis.  This is not simply because Ginsburg has a seeming preference for 
equal protection doctrine over substantive due process doctrine.39  Equal 
 
36 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014), is an excellent example of a rigorous 
application of a melding of due process and equal protection, applying strict 
scrutiny and analyzing each of the state’s asserted interests and whether a same-
sex marriage ban is narrowly tailored to those interests. The opinion of District 
Judge Orlando Garcia in De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014), 
aff'd sub nom. De Leon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015) provides another 
example of a rigorous analysis. The opinion clearly separates the equal protection 
and due process analysis. It first considers the level of scrutiny applicable to sexual 
orientation classifications, stating that such classifications deserve heightened 
scrutiny, although concluding that the same-sex marriage ban did not survive even 
minimal scrutiny and then proceeding with its application to the state’s asserted 
interests and the rational relationship of the means chosen to the interests. Id. at 
650-56. It then analyzes the due process issue, concluding that marriage is a 
fundamental right warranting strict scrutiny of laws that infringe upon the right and 
then summarily concluding that strict scrutiny is not satisfy.  
37 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub nom. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) and rev'd sub nom. Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
38 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting), 
cert. granted sub nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (2015) and rev'd sub 
nom. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
39 See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present in Substantive Due 
Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 553 (2012) (“Given the choice . . . , Justice 
Ginsburg has long favored equal protection over substantive due process 
analysis.”); Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1086 (2009) (“Justice 
Ginsburg has continued to resist the temptation to use substantive due process . . . 
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protection standards can be just as murky as due process ones. Indeed, 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court did articulate one of Justice Ginsburg’s 
seeming jurisprudential beliefs: the interrelationship of equality and due 
process.  The Court in Obergefell clearly rested its opinion on both the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause.40  This is not unique.   
Almost two decades earlier, Justice Ginsburg wrote the Court’s opinion in 
M.L.B. v. S.J.B., involving the state’s duty to provide a transcript for appeal 
in a parental rights termination proceeding, and articulated a similar 
rationale based on precedent and positing a balancing test: “we inspect the 
character and intensity of the individual interest at stake, on the one hand, 
and the State's justification for its exaction, on the other.”41 Interestingly, 
Justice Kennedy penned a short concurrence stating that the case should 
rest on due process clause grounds alone.42 
 
But whatever the constitutional grounding of the Obergefell opinion, more 
rigor would have been welcome.  Justice Kennedy proved unwilling to 
 
.”). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in 
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985). 
40 The Court stated: 
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment 
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. 
The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental 
right to marry.  
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05. 
41 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120-21 (1996). Justice Ginsburg reasoned that 
the Court's decisions concerning access to judicial processes “reflect both equal 
protection and due process concerns.” Id. at 120. 
The equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy of fencing out 
would be appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs. The 
due process concern homes in on the essential fairness of the state ordered 
proceedings anterior to adverse state action.  
Id. However, she explained that most decisions in this area have rested on an equal 
protection framework because “due process does not independently require that the 
State provide a right to appeal.” Id.  
42 Id. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In my view the cases most on point, and 
the ones which persuade me we must reverse the judgment now reviewed, are the 
decisions addressing procedures involving the rights and privileges inherent in 
family and personal relations . . . . all cases resting exclusively upon the Due 
Process Clause. Here, due process is quite a sufficient basis for our holding.”).  
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provide analytic clarity; I believe Justice Ginsburg’s opinion would have 
been at least as rigorous as most of the lower court opinions.  Even if 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court would not have articulated the 
traditional due process or equal protection levels of scrutiny with a 
concomitant analysis of whether the proffered government interests served 
those interests, it would not have substituted sentimentality for such an 
analysis.  
 
II. 
SENTIMENTALITY 
 
The penultimate paragraph of Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in 
Obergefell declares: 
 
No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the 
highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In 
forming a marital union, two people become something greater 
than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases 
demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past 
death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they 
disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, 
respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for 
themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in 
loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest institutions. 
They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution 
grants them that right.43 
 
Certainly there is room for disagreement regarding the tone of this passage: 
some will applaud its emotional eloquence while others will disparage its 
sentimentality. Justice Ginsburg seems to eschew such rhetoric; one can 
search in vain in her opinions for similar text. It is not that Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinions have not addressed topics of high passion. Her 
opinions for the Court in United States v. Virginia (VMI) and M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J. could easily have included more poignant passages.44   
 
 
43 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608. 
44 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (regarding equal educational 
opportunities for women); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (regarding 
termination of parental rights of a mother). 
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To label Justice Kennedy’s language sentimental is unquestionably 
insulting. “But just what sentimentality is and why it is objectionable is 
something of a mystery,” just as much today as more than three decades 
ago when this statement appeared in Mark Jefferson’s influential essay 
“What’s Wrong With Sentimentality?”45  Moreover, there is a conflation of 
sentimentality as an aesthetic matter and as an ethical one.46 For Mark 
Jefferson, the problem with sentimentality - - - seemingly as both an 
aesthetic and ethical matter - - - is its distortion of reality.  Moreover, this 
distortion is one that emphasizes “the sweetness, dearness, littleness, 
blamelessness, and vulnerability of the emotions’ objects,” what he names 
the “fiction of innocence.”47  Jefferson identifies the “moral danger” of this 
fiction, using E.M. Forster’s novel A Passage to India as illustration, as the 
tendency to extend the distortion beyond the sentimentalized good person 
to a caricatured vilification of the oppositional figure.48   
 
The dissenting opinions in Obergefell might be heard to echo the dynamic 
Jefferson articulated when they invoke - - - and object to - - - the Court’s 
implicit creation of the oppositional figure of “the bigot.” Chief Justice 
Roberts complained, “It is one thing for the majority to conclude that the 
Constitution protects a right to same-sex marriage; it is something else to 
portray everyone who does not share the majority's ‘better informed 
understanding’ as bigoted.” 49 Although Justice Kennedy’s opinion does 
 
45 Mark Jefferson, What’s Wrong With Sentimentality?, 92 MIND 519 (1983).  
46 In her brilliant essay In Defense of Saccharin(e), Leslie Jamison succinctly 
articulates the distinction and the conflicting objections: 
While its moral critics tend to attack sentimentality because it accords an 
undue agency to emotions—distracting us from “reason” and tenable 
ethics—its aesthetic opponents attack sentimentality from the opposite 
direction, claiming it does our emotions a disservice by flattening them 
into dual oblivions of hyperbole and simplicity. 
Leslie Jamison, In Defense of Saccharin(e), in THE EMPATHY EXAMS 111 (2014).  
47 Jefferson, supra note 45, at 526-27, 529. 
48 Id. at 527-28 (citing E.M. FORSTER, A PASSAGE TO INDIA (1961) [originally 
published 1924]). Jefferson’s discussion focuses on the character Miss Quested, 
who was not particularly liked but who comes to be viewed as symbolizing the 
purity and bravery of English womanhood after she alleges an Indian doctor 
attacked her. Jefferson argues that as a corollary to this portrait, the Indian doctor 
must then be viewed as her opposite: a “treacherous monster.” Id.   
49 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
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not use any form of the term “bigot,” Chief Justice Roberts grounded his 
characterization in the language Kennedy does use: 
Americans who did nothing more than follow the 
understanding of marriage that has existed for our entire 
history—in particular, the tens of millions of people who 
voted to reaffirm their States' enduring definition of 
marriage—have acted to “lock ... out,” “disparage,” 
“disrespect and subordinate,” and inflict “[d]ignitary 
wounds” upon their gay and lesbian neighbors.50 
Justice Scalia took a somewhat different approach, but nevertheless 
impugned the Court’s opinion for (implicitly) characterizing oppositional 
viewpoints as “bigotry.”51  And Justice Alito, indulging in his own 
sentimentalized rhetoric, lamented the impact of the Court’s opinion as 
including the risk that “those who cling to old beliefs” will be “labeled as 
bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and schools” if they 
dare repeat their views in public rather than “whisper their thoughts in the 
recesses of their homes.”52  
 
There is another - - - and to my mind, more important - - - “moral danger” 
of vilification posed by Justice Kennedy’s sentimentalization that is not 
addressed by any of the various opinions in Obergefell. This peril was, 
however, contemplated by many scholars including myself as the 
“marriage equality” movement became a centerpiece of LGBTQ advocacy.  
As the 2006 statement, “Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A Strategic Vision 
for All Our Families and Relationships,” articulated it: 
 
Marriage is not the only worthy form of family or 
relationship, and it should not be legally and economically 
 
50 Id. (quoting majority opinion).  
51 The five Justices in the majority 
know that limiting marriage to one man and one woman is contrary to 
reason; they know that an institution as old as government itself, and 
accepted by every nation in history until 15 years ago, cannot possibly be 
supported by anything other than ignorance or bigotry. And they are 
willing to say that any citizen who does not agree with that, who adheres 
to what was, until 15 years ago, the unanimous judgment of all 
generations and all societies, stands against the Constitution. 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
52 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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privileged above all others. . . . LGBT movement strategies 
must never secure privilege for some while at the same time 
foreclosing options for many. Our strategies should expand 
the current terms of debate, not reinforce them.53 
 
On this view, same-sex marriage has the potential to divide LGBTQ 
persons into two groups: the deserving and the undeserving.54 For example, 
this demarcation “serves as a convenient division between ‘good’ lesbians 
and ‘bad’ ones.”55 Moreover, this demarcation occurs because pressure to 
assimilate to the “good” group is coercive.56 A stark argument that this 
demarcation is not only inevitable but desirable was advanced by gay male 
conservative Andrew Sullivan in his 1989 article Here Comes the Groom: 
A (Conservative) Case for Gay Marriage.57 Andrew Sullivan’s conclusion 
that the formation of families through "gay marriage" is not a "denial of 
family values" but "an extension of them" is buttressed with a chilling 
argument: "Since persecution is not an option in a civilized society, why 
not coax gays into traditional values rather than rail incoherently against 
them?"58 Thus, this conservative argument contains an implicit promise of 
protection to those who conform our relations to traditional family values 
and a threat of persecution, albeit of a civilized sort, to those who do not.59 
Justice Kennedy’s penultimate paragraph in Obergefell is faithful to 
Sullivan’s view.  In Kennedy’s passage, there is thankfully not persecution, 
but banishment: the “hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness.”60  
Similarly, earlier Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated, “Marriage responds to 
 
53 Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A Strategic Vision for All Our Families and 
Relationships (July 26, 2006), at 2, 5, 
http://www.beyondmarriage.org/beyondmarriage.pdf. 
54 See id. at 2 (“To have our government define as ‘legitimate families’ only those 
households with couples in conjugal relationships does a tremendous disservice to 
the many other ways in which people actually construct their families, kinship 
networks, households, and relationships.”).  
55 Ruthann Robson, Sappho Goes to Law School 166 (1998).  
56 Id. 
57Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay 
Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20. 
58 Id. 
59 See ROBSON, supra note 55, at 166. 
60 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).  
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the universal fear that a lonely person might call out only to find no one 
there.”61  
Paeans to marriage in United States Supreme Court cases are nothing 
new.62 Justice Kennedy’s opinion quotes from two of the most famous:63 
the Supreme Court's oft-repeated 1888 pronouncement in Maynard v. Hill 
that marriage is “the most important relation in life,” and “the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization 
nor progress”64 and this century’s hyperbole in Griswold v. Connecticut 
that marriage “is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, 
and intimate to the degree of being sacred.”65  But neither Maynard, in 
which the issue was the validity of a legislatively declared territory divorce, 
nor Griswold, in which the issue was the constitutionality of contraception 
prohibition under the Due Process Clause, contained such implicitly 
exclusionary rhetoric.66 As one commentator noted, Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion makes it seem as if being unmarried makes the world “empty and 
awful.”67  This sentimentalized rhetoric operates to make marriage seem as 
compulsory as heterosexuality once was.68 
 
Moreover, such sentimentalization can support the denial of the very rights 
that many LGBTQ persons depend upon for sexual autonomy, including 
 
61 Id. at 2600.  
62 See Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. 
L. REV. 709, 793 (2002).  
63 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.  
64 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205, 211 (1888). 
65 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
66 See Robson, supra note 62, at 793.  
67 Michael Cobb, The Supreme Court’s Lonely Hearts Club, Op-Ed, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2015), http://nyti ms/1dvrvfj. Cobb also wondered  
how Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan — two of the most high-
profile single women in the federal government — felt as they reviewed 
and had to join Justice Kennedy’s opinion: “No union is more profound 
than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, 
devotion, sacrifice, and family.” 
Id.  
68 See Ruthann Robson, Compulsory Matrimony, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL 
THEORY: INTIMATE ENCOUNTERS, UNCOMFORTABLE CONVERSATIONS 313 (Martha 
Albertson Fineman et. al. eds., 2009) (arguing that just as a variety of forces 
impose, organize, and propagandize heterosexuality, a variety of forces impose, 
organize, and propagandize the political institution of marriage). 
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the right to abortion that is constitutionally linked to sexual autonomy and 
is practically important for many women, especially including young 
lesbians.69  In his opinion for the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding 
the constitutionality of a Congressional statute severely restricting abortion, 
Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the 
bond of love the mother has for her child. The Act 
recognizes this reality as well. Whether to have an abortion 
requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we 
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret 
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and 
sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.70 
 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, joined by Stevens, Breyer, and 
Souter, castigates this sentimentalism as  archaic paternalism:  
 
Because of women's fragile emotional state and because of 
the “bond of love the mother has for her child,” the Court 
worries, doctors may withhold information about the nature 
of the intact D & E procedure.” The solution the Court 
approves, then, is not to require doctors inform women, 
accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and 
their attendant risks. Instead, the Court deprives women of 
the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense 
of their safety. This way of thinking reflects ancient notions 
about women's place in the family and under the 
Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.71 
 
69 See Ruthann Robson, Lesbians & Abortions, 35 NYU REV. LAW & SOC. 
CHANGE 247 (2011) (arguing that in additional to the constitutional links regarding 
sexual autonomy, lesbians need access to abortion because of male violence that 
includes rape and because they may be “reproductive amateurs” who are not 
familiar with birth control or have access to informal networks of knowledge about 
pregnancy).  
70 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citations omitted).  
71 Id. at 183-86 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In support of her contention, Ginsburg 
wrote: 
Compare, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412, 422–423 (1908) 
(“protective” legislation imposing hours-of-work limitations on women 
only held permissible in view of women’s “physical structure and a 
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Ginsburg’s rebuke makes it clear that Kennedy’s sentimentalism can be 
deployed to negate sexual autonomy.  Mark Jefferson’s insight that 
sentimentality is directed to  “the sweetness, dearness, littleness, 
blamelessness, and vulnerability of the emotions’ objects,” in a “fiction of 
innocence72 implies that sentimentality tends toward the repudiation of 
autonomy.  Autonomous choices, especially sexual ones, are rarely 
characterized as sweet or dear or blameless.  Indeed, they imply a 
knowledge that is the opposite of innocence. 
It is difficult to imagine that Justice Ginsburg would have included 
sentimental rhetoric had she authored the Court’s opinion in Obergefell.   
Rather than Justice Kennedy’s invocations of personal loneliness that 
would be cured by allowing same-sex couples to marry, Justice Ginsburg 
may have stressed that the institution of marriage itself was in the process 
of necessary change. Echoing her comments during oral argument, her 
opinion might have emphasized that it would be a mistake to “cling to 
marriage as it once was” given that marriage had perpetuated inequality.73  
 
proper discharge of her maternal funct[ion]”); Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 
130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“Man is, or should be, 
woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and 
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of 
the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount destiny and mission of 
woman are to fulfil[l] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”), 
with United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 533, 542, n. 12 (1996) 
(State may not rely on “overbroad generalizations” about the “talents, 
capacities, or preferences” of women; “[s]uch judgments have . . . 
impeded . . . women’s progress toward full citizenship stature throughout 
our Nation’s history”); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U. S. 199, 207 (1977) 
(gender-based Social Security classification rejected because it rested on 
“archaic and overbroad generalizations” “such as assumptions as to 
[women’s] dependency” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Id. (ellipses in original).  
72 See Jefferson, supra note 45 and surrounding text.  
73 Transcript of Oral Argument at 71, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (Nos. 14–556, 14–562, 14–571, 14–574), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-
556q1_l5gm.pdf. 
Earlier she stated: 
But you wouldn't be asking for this relief if the law of marriage was what 
it was a millennium ago. I mean, it wasn't possible. Same-sex unions 
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Thus, rather than sentimentalizing same-sex couples or marriage, she might 
have articulated a more rigorous analytic structure for resolving future 
disputes.74  She might also have brought to bear the jurisprudential integrity 
she has exhibited across various identities and issues, including those 
involving race.   
 
III 
JURISPRUDENTIAL INTEGRITY 
 
The issue of judicial review - - - when the federal courts should intervene 
to declare a legislative act unconstitutional - - - is one of the most vexing in 
a constitutional democracy.75  A widely accepted theory derived from 
Carolene Products footnote four suggests that there should be more 
“searching judicial inquiry” when democratically enacted statutes are 
directed at particular religious, national or racial minorities, or when 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” seriously curtails “the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities.”76  It is most famously expressed in John Hart Ely's 
representation-reinforcement theory of judicial review, positing that “courts 
should protect those who cannot protect themselves politically.”77  Exactly 
what this means is of course unclear; Ely himself thought that under this 
theory women should not be protected, but that “fetuses” should.78 
Nevertheless, when courts act to safeguard majoritarian enactments against 
some minorities but not others, such disparities implicate jurisprudential 
integrity.  
 
would not have opted into the pattern of marriage, which was a 
relationship, a dominant and a subordinate relationship. Yes, it was 
marriage between a man and a woman, but the man decided where the 
couple would be domiciled; it was her obligation to follow him. 
   There was a change in the institution of marriage to make it egalitarian 
when it wasn't egalitarian. And same-sex unions wouldn't -- wouldn't fit 
into what marriage was once. 
Id. at 10-11.   
74 See supra Section I.  
75 See Ruthann Robson, Judicial Review and Sexual Freedom, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 
1 (2007). 
76 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).  
77 John Hart Ely, Democracy And Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 152 
(1980).  
78 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1973).  
SUBMISSION COPY--NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION 
20 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. __:_ 
 
 
 
At its most generous interpretation, the representation-reinforcement theory 
embodied in footnote four of Carolene Products might place sexual 
minorities and racial minorities in the same status.  Current equal 
protection doctrine differs; it generally accords racial classifications strict 
scrutiny while sexual orientation classifications merit a heightened 
rationality standard that includes a consideration of animus.79 Justice 
Kennedy’s jurisprudential approach seemingly inverts this: it identifies 
LGBTQ persons as worthy of judicial protection, while racialized persons 
are relegated to the political process until they are successful, after which 
their successes will be rigorously scrutinized.  
 
Three recent cases involving the constitutionality of race-based enactments 
illuminate Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence regarding race.  In Schuette v. 
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & 
Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), Justice Kennedy wrote 
the plurality opinion upholding the constitutionality of Michigan’s Proposal 
2 which banned affirmative action on the basis of race and gender.80 In 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, Justice Kennedy authored the 
opinion for the Court vacating and remanding the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion 
that the university’s affirmative action policy was constitutional.81 And in 
Shelby County v. Holder, Justice Kennedy joined the opinion for Court 
declaring unconstitutional section four of the federal Voting Rights Act that 
 
79 The Court has repeatedly made clear the level of scrutiny for all racial 
classifications, see, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 
(2013) (“Any racial classification must meet strict scrutiny, for when government 
decisions ‘touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a 
judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.’”). However, the Court’s 
opinions on sexual orientation classifications - - - the opinions in the LGBTQ 
quartet all authored by Justice Kennedy - - - are much less clear. For a good 
discussion of rational basis scrutiny with animus as applied to sexual orientation 
classifications, see Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 887 (2012).  
80 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights 
& Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
81 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). The Fisher 
controversy will be returning to the Court in the 2015 Term; the Fifth Circuit 
essentially confirmed its earlier decision on remand and the Court again granted 
certiorari. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. 
granted, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015).  
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included a “formula” provoking procedures meant to address racial voting 
discrimination in states.82  Thus, in each of these cases, whether upholding 
the legislative enactment as in Schuette or striking the state action as in 
Fisher and Shelby, Justice Kennedy’s position impugns racialized 
minorities. 
 
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court does confront the 
apparent inconsistency with Schuette.  In Schuette v BAMN, Kennedy’s 
plurality opinion emphasized allowing the democratic process to prevail 
over court intervention on the “sensitive,” “divisive” and “profound” 
subject of racial affirmative action.83  In Obergefell, Kennedy, essentially 
quoting himself, noted that Schuette “reaffirmed the importance of the 
democratic principle” when it recognized the “right of citizens to debate so 
they can learn and decide and then, through the political process, act in 
concert to try to shape the course of their own times.”84 However, he 
continued in Obergefell,  
 
as Schuette also said, “[t]he freedom secured by the 
Constitution consists, in one of its essential dimensions, of 
the right of the individual not to be injured by the unlawful 
exercise of governmental power.” Thus, when the rights of 
persons are violated, “the Constitution requires redress by 
the courts,” notwithstanding the more general value of 
democratic decisionmaking. This holds true even when 
protecting individual rights affects issues of the utmost 
importance and sensitivity.85 
 
 
82 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617 (2013).  
83 See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638 (“Deliberative debate on sensitive issues such as 
racial preferences all too often may shade into rancor. But that does not justify 
removing certain court-determined issues from the voters' reach. Democracy does 
not presume that some subjects are either too divisive or too profound for public 
debate.”).  
84 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015) (“Of course, the 
Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so 
long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights. Last Term, a plurality of 
this Court reaffirmed the importance of the democratic principle in Schuette v. 
BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014), noting the “right of citizens to debate so they can 
learn and decide and then, through the political process, act in concert to try to 
shape the course of their own times.”). 
85 Id. (citations omitted).   
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Thus, for Justice Kennedy, there is no injury when a state voter referendum 
bans affirmative action by amending the state constitution to prohibit it.  
The very specific injury recognized in the dissenting opinion by Justice 
Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, as well as the Sixth Circuit en banc 
opinion being reversed, was that a person advocating race-sensitive 
admission policies could only do so through amending the state 
constitution while a person advocating almost any other admission policy 
could simply persuade the Board of Regents.86  One might almost say that 
the state constitutional “amendment imposes a special disability upon those 
persons alone,” who can only obtain relief “by enlisting the citizenry” of 
the state “to amend the State Constitution,” as Kennedy did say in the 
Court’s opinion in Romer v. Evans concluding that a state constitutional 
amendment prohibiting sexual minority anti-discrimination laws violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment.87  But Kennedy did not say that in his opinion 
 
86 The Sixth Circuit’s opinion began by focusing on the injury in concrete terms: 
A student seeking to have her family's alumni connections considered in 
her application to one of Michigan's esteemed public universities could do 
one of four things to have the school adopt a legacy-conscious admissions 
policy: she could lobby the admissions committee, she could petition the 
leadership of the university, she could seek to influence the school's 
governing board, or, as a measure of last resort, she could initiate a 
statewide campaign to alter the state's constitution. The same cannot be 
said for a black student seeking the adoption of a constitutionally 
permissible race-conscious admissions policy. That student could do only 
one thing to effect change: she could attempt to amend the Michigan 
Constitution—a lengthy, expensive, and arduous process—to repeal the 
consequences of Proposal 2. The existence of such a comparative 
structural burden undermines the Equal Protection Clause's guarantee that 
all citizens ought to have equal access to the tools of political change. 
Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equal. By Any Means Necessary v. Regents of Univ. of Michigan, 701 F.3d 466, 
470 (6th Cir. 2012), rev'd sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative 
Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
       Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion contains a similar explanation. 
See Schuette 134 S. Ct. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“As a result of § 26, 
there are now two very different processes through which a Michigan citizen is 
permitted to influence the admissions policies of the State's universities: one for 
persons interested in race-sensitive admissions policies and one for everyone 
else.”). 
87 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
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for the Court in Schuette. Indeed, the opinion in Schuette does not 
distinguish, or even mention, Romer v. Evans.88  
 
Justice Kennedy’s tendency toward the protection of LGBTQ persons with 
a concomitant lack of protection for racial minorities has not gone 
unnoticed.  For example, as Professor Russell Robinson has demonstrated 
in his empirical analysis of Justice Kennedy’s votes regarding 
constitutional claims involving race, sex, and sexual orientation, Kennedy 
is generally supportive of sexual orientation claims while he is generally 
hostile to claims involving race (and even more hostile to claims involving 
sex/gender).89  Similarly, but without focusing on Justice Kennedy in 
particular, Professor Atiba Ellis has argued that the Court’s post-racial and 
“triumphalist” narrative regarding the contemporary irrelevancy of race is 
accompanied by “an implicit narrative about the hierarchy of rights needing 
to turn its attention to the truly marginalized: homosexuals.”90 And in 
considering the cases decided in the 2012 Term, including Windsor, Fisher, 
and Shelby County, Professor Reva Siegel has argued that the disparate 
decisions in the race and sexual orientation cases “reflects the vote of only 
one Justice,”  Kennedy.91  She contends that in his opinion for the Court in 
Windsor “asking whether a law's enforcement ‘tells’ minorities they are 
‘unworthy,’ or by asking whether a law's enforcement ‘demeans’ and 
‘humiliates’ them, Justice Kennedy reasons about equality in the tradition 
of Brown.”92  Siegel, however, is not willing to consign Kennedy to the 
post-racialist narrative, noting that Kennedy “clearly repudiated” such a 
view in his concurring opinion in the 2007 case of Parents Involved v. 
 
88 Justice Sotomayor, dissenting in Schuette, does note the similarity of Schuette to 
Romer v. Evans. Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. at 1670-71 (noting that in Romer 
the Court rejected an attempt by the majority to transfer decisionmaking authority 
from localities, where the targeted minority group could influence the process, to 
state government, where it had less ability to participate effectively, and thus the 
minority was forced to enlist the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State 
Constitution, just as in the case before the Court in Schuette). 
89 Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 67 STAN. L. REV. ___ (2015) 
(forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2476714. 
90 Atiba R. Ellis, Reviving the Dream: Equality and the Democratic Promise in the 
Post-Civil Rights Era, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 789, 846 (2014). 
91 Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 91-92 
(2013). 
92 Id.  
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Seattle.93 Subsequently, Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Texas Dep't of 
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. - - - rendered 
the day before Obergefell at the end of the 2014 Term- - - held that racial 
disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.94  
Although a nonconstitutional case with a somewhat narrow holding, 
Kennedy notably stated that much “progress remains to be made in our 
Nation's continuing struggle against racial isolation, and  that the federal 
Fair Housing Act “must play an important part” in preventing the 
realization of predictions that the United States is “moving toward two 
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”95   
 
Inclusive Communities may indicate that Justice Kennedy’s views on race - 
- - and a judicial orientation towards racial equality - - - are leaning more 
towards those of Justice Ginsburg.96  But another case from the 2014 Term, 
rendered the week before Inclusive Communities and Obergefell points in 
the opposite direction.  In Kerry v. Din, a due process challenge to a visa 
denial, race is implicit, but citizenship, marriage, and the Court’s role are 
central.97 Fauzia Din, a United States citizen, sought further explanation for 
the denial of a visa to her husband, an Afghan citizen. The Court’s plurality 
 
93 Id. at 92 & n.466 (citing and quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-88 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The 
enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”)). 
94 Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).  
95 Inclusive Communities Project, 135 S. Ct. at 2525 (quoting and citing REPORT 
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) 
(KERNER COMMISSION REPORT)). It is noteworthy that Kennedy harkens back to 
the Kerner Commission Report given its conclusion that “the uprisings of the 
1960s arose in no small measure from the ghettoization and racial apartheid of 
American cities.” Alan White, The Supreme Court, the Fair Housing Act and the 
Racism Debate, CREDIT SLIPS (July 9, 2015),  
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2015/07/the-supreme-court-the-fair-housing-
act-and-the-racism-debate- html. 
96 Richard Rothstein, Symposium: Fisher II – Could a Surprise be in Store?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept.8, 2015), 
 http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/09/symposium-fisher-ii-could-a-surprise-be-in-
store/ (“Will Justice Ginsburg find a new ally on affirmative action issues in the 
author of the Court’s fair housing/disparate impact decision, ensuring that the 
University of Texas can continue to make very minor efforts to consciously 
integrate its student body?”). 
97 Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (plurality). 
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opinion, by Justice Scalia, found that Fauzia Din did not have a cognizable 
liberty interest in her marriage under the Due Process Clause.98 Justice 
Kennedy, concurring, found that the Court should not reach the liberty 
issue because even “assuming she has such an interest, the Government 
satisfied due process when it notified Din's husband that his visa was 
denied under the immigration statute's terrorism bar.”99  Kennedy’s opinion 
thus does not engage in any discussion of marriage, sentimentalized or 
otherwise, as providing a liberty interest worthy of protection.  Instead, 
Justice Kennedy analogizes Fauzia Din’s marital due process claim to a 
group of professors’ First Amendment claim challenging the denial of a 
visa to a Marxist scholar they had invited to speak at a university.100  
Kennedy contended that given the Attorney General’s discretion regarding 
visas, the courts should not “look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor 
test it by balancing its justification against” the constitutional interests of 
citizens the visa denial might implicate.101   
 
Thus, for Kennedy, the consular office’s general reason for denying the 
visa - - - terrorism - - - needed no further elaboration, either with reference 
to specific subsections of the statute or with a disclosure of any factual 
basis.102  This almost complete deference occurs not only in the context of 
 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 2136 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Alito joined Kennedy’s opinion. 
100 Id. at 2139-40 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)). 
101 Id. at 2140 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770). 
102 Id. at  2140-41. Justice Kennedy argued that the Government’s citation of the 
“subsection” of the statutory provision, 8 USC § 1182(a)(3)(B), was sufficient 
because it “specifies discrete factual predicates the consular officer must find to 
exist before denying a visa.”  Id. at 2141. However, as the dissenting opinion sets 
out, the § 1182(a)(3)(B) provision: 
sets forth, not one reason, but dozens. It is a complex provision with 10 
different subsections, many of which cross-reference other provisions of 
law. See Appendix, infra. Some parts cover criminal conduct that is 
particularly serious, such as hijacking aircraft and assassination. §§ 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), (IV). Other parts cover activity that, depending on 
the factual circumstances, cannot easily be labeled “terrorist.” One set of 
cross-referenced subsections, for example, brings within the section's visa 
prohibition any individual who has “transfer[red] ... [any] material 
financial benefit” to “a group of two or more individuals, whether 
organized or not, which ... has a subgroup which engages” in “afford[ing] 
material support ... for ... any individual who ... plans” “[t]he use of any ... 
weapon ... with intent ... to cause substantial damage to property.” §§ 
SUBMISSION COPY--NOT FOR CIRCULATION OR DISTRIBUTION 
26 UMKC LAW REVIEW [Vol. __:_ 
 
 
executive power but also with reference to the racialized subjects in this 
immigration case, albeit without explicit references to race, only 
nationality.  The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Breyer and joined 
by Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, found a liberty interest in the marriage 
and concluded that the visa denial was the type of individualized 
adjudication that normally calls for the ordinary application of Due Process 
Clause procedures.103  The dissent recognized that “national security” was 
important, but argued that “the presence of security considerations does not 
suspend the Constitution,” and that the process Ms. Din sought was 
minimal: a statement of reasons for the denial of the visa.104 Thus, the 
dissent argued, the courts should intervene to vindicate the liberty interest 
of Ms. Din and require at least some minimal due process from the 
government. 
 
Justice Kennedy’s various positions invite speculation and explanation; 
Justice Ginsburg’s do not.  Justice Ginsburg has consistently ruled in favor 
of the Court’s role in protecting minorities, including sexual minorities and 
racialized minorities. She joined Justice Kennedy’s opinions in the quartet 
of LGBTQ cases and she joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Inclusive 
Communities Project regarding the Fair Housing Act.  But in Schuette, she 
was the sole Justice to join the dissent of Justice Sotomayor, which 
concluded by noting the Court’s failure: “For members of historically 
marginalized groups, which rely on the federal courts to protect their 
constitutional rights, the decision can hardly bolster hope for a vision of 
democracy that preserves for all the right to participate meaningfully and 
equally in self-government.”105 In Fisher, Justice Ginsburg was the lone 
dissenter,106 repeating her position that “government actors, including state 
 
1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), (vi)(III), (iv)(VI)(bb), (iii)(V). At the same time, 
some subsections provide the visa applicant with a defense; others do not.  
Id. at 2145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (ellipses in original). 
103 Id. at 2142. The dissent also stressed that “Ms. Din seeks to protect consists of 
her freedom to live together with her husband in the United States. She seeks 
procedural, not substantive, protection for this freedom.” Id. 
104 Id. at  2141-42. 
105 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equal. By Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1683 (2014). (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
106 Justice Ginsburg as the only dissenting Justice in Fisher has perplexed some. 
As in Schuette, Justice Kagan “took no part in the consideration or decision of the 
case.” Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2414 (2013). A “behind 
the scenes” explanation for Justice Sotomayor’s joining of Kennedy’s opinion for 
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universities, need not be blind to the lingering effects of ‘an overtly 
discriminatory past,’ the legacy of ‘centuries of law-sanctioned inequality,’ 
and that the candid disclosure of considerations of race is preferable to 
dissembling.107 And in Shelby County v. Holder, Justice Ginsburg wrote the 
opinion for the four dissenters that the success of the Voting Rights Act 
should not prove its dormancy and that “the evolution of voting 
discrimination into more subtle second-generation barriers is powerful 
evidence that a remedy as effective as preclearance remains vital to protect 
minority voting rights and prevent backsliding.”108  When the issue was the 
due process to be accorded when a marital relationship was at stake in 
Kerry v. Din, Justice Ginsburg joined the opinion that clearly argued for a 
liberty interest and clearly argued that the government was not entitled to 
absolute deference.109 
 
In these and other cases Justice Ginsburg’s position is consistent: the Court 
should act as a guardian to ensure that our constitutional narrative is one 
that extends constitutional protections to “people once ignored or 
excluded.”110 She would have brought that jurisprudential integrity to any 
opinion for the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges.  
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Justice Ginsburg stated that it was “more powerful” for the Court majority 
to speak with one voice in Obergefell v. Hodges.111  This is difficult to 
contradict. But considering Obergefell’s lack of doctrinal rigor and its 
resort to sentimentality, as well as issues of jurisprudential integrity, it is  
 
the Court was that a compromise in Kennedy’s opinion - - - remanding the case 
rather than reversing it - - - convinced Sotomayor to withhold her draft dissent. See 
JOAN BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN : THE RISE OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR AND THE POLITICS 
OF JUSTICE 200-10 (2014).  
107 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433-34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
108 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2651 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
109 Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
110 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996). 
111 See supra note 11 and surrounding text. 
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regrettable that the one voice is that of Justice Kennedy.  How much better  
- - - and indeed, more powerful - - - it would have been if the Court 
majority’s one voice in Obergefell had been that of Justice Ginsburg.  
